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• Decision-support methods for implementation 
decisions within organizations. 
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ABSTRACT
In unpredictable software manufacturer organizations, it is 
difficult to determine when a software product will be released, 
the features the product will have, the associated development 
costs or the resulting product quality. The NPVI-method is 
presented, enabling a software manufacturer to compare and 
evaluate different release or market entry strategies. However, 
information has its price in time and cost, forcing decision-makers 
to make a trade-off between search costs and opportunity costs. In 
addition, decision-makers simplify the real world, as they cannot 
escape the diverse psychological forces that influence individual 
behaviour. Combined with the potential presence of sources of 
conflict, this often leads to the situation where different 
stakeholders experience difference aspiration levels. As such, 
satisficing behaviour where decision-makers try to find consensus 
and choose a satisfactory release alternative is a good 
characterisation of the software release decision-making process 
as found in practice. Successful adoption of the NPVI-method 
requires that software manufacturers reach the zone of cost 
effectiveness for the perfection of information; a zone where 
numbers make business sense, and can be convincingly used to 
support informed decision-making. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.8 [Software Engineering]: Metrics – process metrics, 
product metrics.
K.6.3 [Management of Computing and Information Systems]: 
Software Management – software development, software 
maintenance.
General Terms
Management, Measurement, Economics. 
Keywords
Optimal release time, maximizing behaviour, optimizing 
behaviour, satisficing behaviour, decision-making. 
1. INTRODUCTION
A relatively unexplored area in the field of software management 
is the release or market entry decision, deciding whether or not a 
software product can be transferred from its development phase to 
operational use. As many software manufacturers behave in an 
unpredictable manner [1] [12], they have difficulty in determining 
the ‘right’ moment to release their software products. It is a trade-
off between an early release, to capture the benefits of an earlier 
market introduction, and the deferral of product release, to 
enhance functionality, or improve quality. A release decision is a 
trade-off where, in theory, the objective is to maximize the 
economic value. Inputs into the release decision are expected cash 
inflows and outflows if the product is released. What is the market 
window? What are the additional pre-release development costs 
when continuing testing and the expected post-release 
maintenance costs when releasing now? 
2. MAXIMIZING BEHAVIOUR 
A market entry decision is a trade-off between early release to 
capture the benefits of an earlier market introduction (a larger 
installed base), and the deferral of product release to enhance 
functionality, or improve quality. For many software 
manufacturers, especially those operating in mass markets, this is 
the point of no return. At first sight, this trade-off seems not to be 
of any special nature, from a strictly economic perspective. If a 
software product is released ‘too early’, a software product with 
less functionality and/or significant defects would be released to 
intended users and the software manufacturer incurs post-release 
costs of later fixing failures. If a software product is released ‘too 
late’, the additional development cost, and the opportunity cost, of 
missing a market window could be substantial. These two 
alternatives need to be compared, to determine which alternative 
maximizes economic value (revenues minus costs). When the 
perspective of maximizing behaviour is assumed, the primary 
objective of a software manufacturer is to maximize long-term 
expected value. In that case, it is needed to be able to evaluate and 
compare different market entry strategies: which strategy will 
maximize economic value? 
Product life-cycle models, as for instance frequently used in the 
semiconductor industry, can be used to demonstrate the effects on 
revenues of a delayed market entry [5] [6] [15]. By extending 
these models with cost functions for pre-release development 
costs and post-release operational costs the effects on profits can 
be calculated as well. Based on these profit models, a method was 
defined using the NPV capital budgeting method. Different 
alternatives can be evaluated by comparing their NPV values. 
Erdogmus introduces a method for comparative evaluation of 
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for 
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are 
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that 
copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy 
otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, 
requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. 
EDSER’06, May 27, 2006, Shanghai, China. 
Copyright 2006 ACM 1-59593-085-X/06/0005...$5.00.
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software development strategies based on NPV-calculations, used 
to compare custom-built systems and systems based on 
Commercial ‘Off the Shelf’ (COTS) software [2]. Erdogmus 
distinguishes comparison metrics for various variables that 
influence the NPV of a project. This method was used as the basis 
for the definition of a method to reflect market entry decisions for 
software-intensive systems. The resulting so-called NPVI-method 
expresses the difference between two alternatives in a single 
variable. This variable, called the Net Present Value Incentive, is 
calculated from various underlying metrics, and measures the 
economic incentive to favour one alternative over another. The 
metrics are classified into premium metrics at the lowest level, 
advantage metrics at the medium level and incentive metrics at 
the highest level. See Figure 1. This method allows the 
comparison of different alternatives during different project 
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Net Present Value Incentive
Figure 1. Breakdown of NPV Incentive to Lower-level 
Metrics. 
At the lowest level, two categories of premium metrics are 
distinguished:
  Asset value premiums. Three variables influencing the asset 
value are considered, namely early market entry (EEP), product 
functionality (PFP) and product reliability (PRP).
  Operational cost premiums. Two variables influencing the 
operational cost are considered, namely the short-term costs for 
corrective maintenance (SMP) and the long-term costs for 
adaptive/perfective maintenance (LMP).
The Asset Value Advantage AVA is equal to the expected increase 
in future cash inflows [difference between the two alternatives Ca
and Cb] and is the contribution of the Early Entry Premium EEP,
the Product Functionality Premium PFP and the Product 
Reliability Premium PRP:
AVA =   log Ca – log Cb
 =   log [ Cb + Cb . (EEP + PFP + PRP) ]  – log Cb
 =   log ( 1 + EEP + PFP + PRP )        (1) 
The Operational Cost Advantage OCA is equal to the future cash 
outflows savings (difference between the two alternatives Mb and 
Ma) when the product is transferred to the operational phase and is 
the contribution of the Short-term Maintenance Premium SMP
(corrective maintenance) and the Long-term Maintenance 
Premium LMP (adaptive/perfective maintenance): 
   OCA =   log Mb – log Ma
 =   log Mb - log [ Mb - Mb . (SMP + LMP) ]  
 =   log [ 1 / (1 - SMP - LMP) ] 
 =   - log ( 1 - SMP - LMP )        (2)
The Asset Value Advantage AVA (expected future cash inflows) 
and the Operational Cost Advantage OCA (expected future cash 
outflows) are combined in the Net Asset Value Advantage NAVA:
NAVA =   log NAVa – log NAVb
 =   log (Ca – Ma) + log (Cb – Mb)
 =   log ( eAVACb – Mb/e
OCA ) – log NAVb        (3) 
The Present Value Incentive PVI is derived from the Net Asset 
Value Advantage NAVA, taking into account the discount rate r
and normalizing it to the base alternative NAVb:
   PVI =   [ PVa – PVb ] / NAVb
 =   [ (NAVa / (1 + r) 
Ta) - (NAVb / (1 + r) 
Tb) ] / NAVb
 =   [ 1 / (1 + r) Tb ] . [ e NAVA / (1 + r) Ta - Tb – 1 ] 
 =   [ 1 / (1 + r) Tb ] . [ e NAVA / (1 + r)  – 1 ]       (4) 
with:
 =   Tb [ (1/e
DTA) – 1 ]        (5) 
The Development Cost Incentive DCI is the normalized 
difference of the development cost between the two alternatives Ib
and Ia considered: 
   DCI =   ( Ib – Ia ) / Ib
 =   1 – (1 / eDCA)         (6) 
This leads to the final Net Present Value Incentive NPVI,
normalized to the project scale: 
   NPVI =   ( NPVa – NPVb ) / ( NAVb + Ib ) 
 =   ( PVa – Ia – PVb + Ib ) / ( NAVb + Ib ) 
 =   ( PVI . NAVb + DCI . Ib ) / ( NAVb + Ib )      (7) 
The original method was developed to compare different product 
development strategies for making investment appraisals. The 
adjusted method can be used in a similar fashion but more 
accurately reflects specific criteria related to a software release 
decision: reliability and expected short-term and long-term 
maintenance costs. Due to its general nature, the adjusted method 
may also be used during product development, for example, to 
compare and evaluate different product development strategies, 
architecture or design alternatives and technology adoption 
strategies. 
3. OPTIMIZING BEHAVIOUR 
Maximizing behaviour assumes that decision-makers have 
complete information about costs and benefits associated with 
each option. They compare the options on a single scale of 
preference, value or utility. Modern behavioural economics 
acknowledge however, that the assumption of perfect (complete 
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and reliable) information is implausible. Etzioni and Amitai argue 
that because, normally, limitations on information will exist, it is 
impossible to undertake the precise analysis necessary to 
maximize economic objectives [3]. Many economists put similar, 
and other arguments, against the case for maximizing behaviour 
[4] [7]. Rather than assuming decision-makers possess all relevant 
information for making choices, information is, itself, treated as a 
commodity, something that has a price in time and/or money. 
This argument of limitations on information can be used to 
‘soften’ maximizing behaviour to optimizing behaviour, where an 
individual decision-maker makes a trade-off between information 
perfection (completeness and reliability) and the cost related to 
searching for additional information. 
This relationship is given in Figure 2. On the horizontal axis, 
Information perfection is measured, which is knowledge about the 
decision outcome of an alternative. When information perfection 
equals 100%, the information is complete and reliable, or, 
supposedly, perfect. The vertical axis measures the value, cost 
and yield (marginal value) as a function of information perfection 
on the horizontal axis. Value refers to how desirable a particular 
decision outcome is considering the value of the alternative, 
whether in money, satisfaction or other benefit. The value curve 
V(i) rises steadily. Cost is the cost involved in searching for 
alternatives, for example, extending information perfection. The 
cost curve C(i) moves in the opposite direction, rising rather 
slowly at the start because the initial information requires 
relatively little effort. Time is the time involved in searching for 
alternatives and moves in the same direction as the cost function. 
Additional information becomes more difficult to obtain and the 
associated cost and time increase exponentially. Yield is the 
difference between value and cost (net value). The yield curve 
Y(i), the difference between the value and cost functions, reduces 
sooner, and more steeply than the value curve. Yield represents 
the net value with the point of diminishing returns, or point of 
optimality Y*, the point where this curve reaches its maximum 
with the corresponding values I*, V* and C*. Beyond this point, 






























Figure 2. Value (V), Cost (C), Time (T) and Yield (Y) as a 
Function of Information Perfection [9].
A decision-maker should look for the point of optimality. Below 
this point, uncertainty is high and might confront a software 
manufacturer with releasing unexpectedly high post-release 
maintenance costs. Beyond this point, the extra information leads 
to additional costs that outweigh the benefits (law of diminishing 
returns). It is assumed that this point of optimality can probably 
not be determined precisely, neither ex ante nor post ante. 
Therefore, instead of finding the point of optimality, software 
manufacturers will in a practical setting be forced to search for a 
zone of cost effectiveness: a bandwidth in which the marginal net 
asset value is equal or close to zero. The information level is 
considered to be cost effective compared to higher or lower levels 
of information if it is: 
(1) Less costly and at least as effective; 
(2) More costly and more effective with an added efficacy 
that is worth paying the additional price for; 
(3) Less effective and less costly, where the additional cost 
of additional information is too high for the additional 
benefits provided.
4. SATISFICING BEHAVIOUR 
Simon argues that limited cognitive capabilities in decision-
makers lead to simplification [11]. A decision-maker simplifies 
reality, leaves out information and applies heuristics as a 
consequence of limited cognitive capabilities. Reasons are, for 
example, that the decision-maker has limited, unreliable or even 
too much information, available, or that the search for acceptable 
alternatives is felt to be too time, and cost, consuming. This
problem of computation is classically illustrated by the traveling 
salesman problem in which the objective is to minimize the travel 
costs of a salesperson having to visit 50 cities. The 50! calculation 
is computable but not within a reasonable time horizon. He 
suggests that in choice situations, people actually have the goal of 
satisficing, rather than maximizing, or optimizing, and a decision-
maker applies heuristic rules of search in a heuristic frame. The 
heuristic (or cognitive) frame referring to the representation of the 
problem and solution space, whereas the heuristic rules of search 
are the algorithms used to find solutions in this solution space 
[10]. Following this approach, an alternative is satisfactory if a set 
of criteria exists that minimally describes satisfactory alternatives, 
and the alternative in question meets, or exceeds, all these criteria 
[7]. A general corresponding strategy is [8]: 
1. Set an aspiration level such that any option that reaches, or 
surpasses it, is ‘good enough’. The aspiration level is the 
smallest outcome deemed satisfactory. 
2. Begin to enumerate and evaluate the options on offer. 
3. Choose the first option which, given the aspiration level, is 
‘good enough’. 
How can this approach be integrated into the model describing 
optimizing behaviour? An example is given in Figure 3, 
incorporating satisficing behaviour at individual level (aspiration 
level for one stakeholder or decision-maker). The aspiration level 
is a horizontal line and reflects the boundary at, or above, which 
the decision-maker is satisfied. The aspiration level is given by 
the line V = V*´, which denotes that a decision-maker will choose 
the first option reaching, or surpassing, V*´ for the value function 
V(i). In the example of Figure 3, the resulting point of optimality 
(I*´, Y*´) does not coincide with the point of optimality (I*, Y*) and 
lies to the left. This is not necessarily the case in general. 
Satisficing behaviour might also lead to setting an aspiration level 
where the resulting level of information exceeds I*. In this case, 
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unnecessary costs are incurred, as the resulting cost value exceeds 
C*.
The aspiration level can also consist of a lower and upper 
boundary. A decision-maker will accept the first option for which:























Figure 3. Adjusted Model to Incorporate Satisficing 
Behaviour of a Single Stakeholder [9]. 
An aspiration level is not necessarily restricted to the value 
function V(i). A decision-maker might, for example, set an 
aspiration level for the information perfection itself, in which case 
the aspiration level would be a vertical line in Figure 3. There 
may also be aspiration levels for cost and/or time: an upper 
boundary constraint Chigh for the cost function C(i) and/or an 
upper boundary constraint Thigh for the time function T(i).
1 It is 
obvious that a solution is only possible if the information level at 





-1(Vlow) <  T
-1(Thigh)
It is concluded here that the notion of optimizing behaviour 
(imperfect information) as discussed in the previous section, must 
be extended with the notion of satisficing behaviour. A decision-
maker simplifies reality, leaves out information and applies 
heuristics as a consequence of limited cognitive capabilities. 
As stakeholders may apply different heuristics and one, or more, 
determinants of conflict may be present, different stakeholders 
may arrive at different aspiration levels during the decision-
making process. This is illustrated in Figure 4, incorporating 
satisficing behaviour at group level, and showing the different 
aspiration levels for three different stakeholders Sa, Sb, and Sc. In 
the ideal situation, all aspiration levels would be equal and be 
within the zone of cost effectiveness (or even intersect with the 
point of optimality). However, in a practical context, with high 
uncertainty, this is not a likely situation. 
                                                                
1 Theoretically a lower boundary for these functions may exist. However it 
is assumed that, in practice, these lower boundaries are equal to 0.























Figure 4. Adjusted Model to Incorporate Satisficing 
Behaviour of Multiple Stakeholders [9].
Stokman explains potential differences in aspiration levels during 
collective decision-making in the following way [14]. He makes a 
distinction between ultimate goals and instrumental goals. 
Instrumental goals are considered a means through which ultimate 
goals can be realized. Utility functions for ultimate goals are 



















Figure 5. Example of Utility Functions of Instrumental and 
Ultimate Goals [9]. 
Controversial decisions usually concern instrumental goals and 
have an optimum: too much, or too little, is bad. The instrumental 
goal of a software manufacturer during product development is to 
release a product to the market. Ultimate goals may be to capture 
a high market share by releasing the product as early as possible 
(first-mover advantage), or to satisfy customers by delivering a 
high-quality product (customer satisfaction), turning the software 
release decision into a dilemma. Too late means market share will 
be lost, too early means dissatisfied customers due to a lower 
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quality product, as in Figure 5. The optimum for the instrumental 
goal depends on the weighting of all ultimate goals. In collective 
decision-making, different stakeholders are likely to assign 
different weights due to different heuristics, and the presence of 
one, or more, determinants of conflict, leads to different 
aspiration levels for the decision outcome.
It is likely different stakeholders will assign different weights to 
the ultimate goals, due to the inter-dependence between 
stakeholders involved. In a practical setting, there may, further, 
even be more than two goals, while different stakeholders will not 
necessarily have identical goals: divergence in goals or objectives 
is likely to be present. Differences in aspiration, among 
stakeholders involved, imply one or more stakeholders must 
change an initial position to reach consensus. Stokman et al.
describe three elements that determine the outcome of a decision 
[13]: the positions of the stakeholders, the salience for the 
stakeholders (the degree to which they are interested in each 
issue) and the capabilities of the stakeholders. The process of 
decision-making is described as the efforts of stakeholders to 
realise an outcome of the decision as close as possible to their 
own position. They distinguish three main processes and 
strategies whereby a stakeholder changes his position: 
  Management of Meaning: the stakeholder receives 
convincing information implying that another position reflects 
his incentive structure better. Important aspects here are: 
1. New information is generally more acceptable in earlier 
stages of the decision-making than in later ones; 
2. A substantial amount of trust in the provider of the 
information increases the likelihood that information is 
accepted as relevant and reliable. 
  Exchange: a stakeholder is prepared to take another position 
on an issue in exchange for a reciprocal move by another 
stakeholder on another issue. Three elements are of importance 
here:
1. The selection of the issues one wants to include in the 
exchange process. 
2. The change one incorporates into one’s own positions. 
3. One’s prioritisation of the issues. 
  Challenge: other stakeholders challenge the position of a 
stakeholder who feels more or less forced to change position. 
This is influenced by: 
1. One’s own position at the beginning of the decision-
making process. 
2. The leverage one shows to others. 
3. Explicit evaluation of the likelihood of success. 
It is argued that a high presence of ‘management of meaning’ 
processes/strategies is favourable in software release decisions, as 
opposed to a low presence of ‘challenge’ and ‘exchange’ 
processes/strategies. A high presence of ‘management of 
meaning’ processes/strategies implies that possible differences in 
positions or aspiration levels are reduced through the acceptance 
of convincing information. 
5. CASE STUDIES 
Ten case studies were conducted to determine the information 
level reached when software manufacturers make the market 
entry decision [9]. The studied environments included 
manufacturer organizations with low and higher process maturity, 
operating in different markets. It was concluded that, at least in 
the studied environments, software manufacturers are not 
consciously aiming at reaching this zone of cost effectiveness. In 
most cases formulated non-functional requirements like reliability 
and maintainability were not deployed during product 
development (design, implementation, and test). It was only 
during testing that reliability again received attention, which may 
be too late to guarantee a high reliability level. The level of 
maintainability obtained was in none of the cases addressed. As a 
result, these manufacturers faced difficulty in making firm 
statements about expected post-release short-term (corrective) and 
long-term (adaptive/perfective) maintenance costs. But also, the 
available information regarding market windows and expected 
cash inflows was severely limited. Thus, the market entry 
decision-making process was in general characterized by lack of 
convincing information. In these cases, the decision was made by 
challenging other stakeholders’ positions (politics) and intuition. 
However, such a decision-process is not favourable in situations, 
where large prospective financial loss outcomes to a software 
manufacturer and its customers/end-users of the software are 
present and even people’s life may be at risk in for instance 
safety-critical products. 
6. EFFECTS OF PROCESS MATURITY 
If the information level is below the zone of cost effectiveness the 
pre-release cash outflows (development cost) will probably be 
lower, as less effort is spent on verification activities and 
implementing identified artefacts. As this incurs high 
‘uncertainty’ for product reliability and product maintainability, 
the expected post-release cash outflows (maintenance cost) are 
likely to be higher. When the information level for product 
reliability and product maintainability is increased, this incurs an 
















Figure 6. Economic Components as a Function of 
Information Perfection [9].
However, as increasing the information will also incur the 
detection and removal of residual defects, post-release cash 
outflows are likely to decrease. Improving information perfection 
can lead to transforming a decision with complete uncertainty 
(zone of cost effectiveness to the left) to a decision with informed 
uncertainty (zone of cost effectiveness moving to the right) or, at 
least in theory, even a decision with certainty (zone of cost 
effectiveness completely to the right). Software manufacturers 
with mature product development processes are assumed to move 
their zone of cost effectiveness to the right: valuable information 
is obtained in less time and probably against less cost. See Figure 
6. This enables them to make market entry decisions with less 
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uncertainty, where the decision-making process is characterized 
by sharing of convincing information. As the number of scenarios 
to be considered might be reduced, and the chance of occurrence 
of each scenario might be better quantified with probability or 
possibility values, it will make the NPVI-method a better 
candidate for evaluating different market entry alternatives. 
7. CONCLUSIONS
The NPVI-method offers the possibility to evaluate and compare 
different market entry strategies. Due to its general nature, the 
method can even be used to compare different product 
development strategies, architecture or design alternatives, and 
technology adoption strategies. However, in a practical context, 
the determination of the optimal release time from a quantitative, 
financial perspective is difficult, if not almost impossible, due to 
the presence of uncertainty. Sources of this uncertainty are:
  The state of the art in software engineering technology is 
such that building software components and products in a 
predictable way with predictable behaviour is uncommon. 
Although new innovations may be, or become, available, their 
application in software industry is severely limited at this stage.  
  Information has its price in time and cost, forcing decision-
makers to make a trade-off between search costs and 
opportunity costs.  
  Decision-makers simplify the real world, as they cannot 
escape the diverse psychological forces that influence 
individual behaviour. Combined with the potential presence of 
sources of conflict, this may lead to the situation where 
different stakeholders experience difference aspiration levels.
Increased attention to numbers, by gathering valid information 
(including historical data) to compare, and evaluate, different 
release alternatives using the presented NPVI-method and sharing 
the results among decision-makers is important to reduce 
uncertainty levels to a more acceptable level, so differences in 
aspiration levels of stakeholders involved in the decision-making 
process, are reduced, or eliminated, through convincing 
information. This is an important contribution to reducing 
uncertainty, and thus minimizing situations where people lives are 
put at risk, especially for software products where reliability, 
safety and security are important non-functional requirements.
Successful adoption of the NPVI-method requires that software 
manufacturers reach the zone of cost effectiveness for the 
perfection of information; a zone where numbers make business 
sense, and can be convincingly used to support informed 
decision-making. It is likely that uncertainty will increase due to 
ever-increasing software size, and the absence of substantial 
improvements in defect potentials and removal efficiencies. 
Without the availability, and successful adoption, of ways to 
significantly improve software productivity and software quality, 
it will become more complex for software manufacturers to attain 
release decision success. In such a situation it is likely that the 
release decision-making process will be dominated by a high 
presence of ‘challenge’ processes and strategies and that the 
numbers will be increasingly less complete and less reliable: they 
still matter but have less value and will probably be ignored, 
leading to intuitive decision-making. Higher maturity will enable 
a software manufacturer to obtain more information in less time 
and against fewer costs. As the zone of cost effectiveness will 
now reveal a higher information level, it will also lead to the 
effects of reduced uncertainty, increased applicability of the 
NPVI-method, and informed decision-making based on sharing 
convincing information. 
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